The Flynn Clayman Blueprint

A three-year analytical study of High Point’s offensive identity, roster construction and defensive evolution

Across the three seasons in which Flynn Clayman has directed High Point’s offense, the Panthers have not operated from one rigid playbook. Personnel, pace and shot distribution have changed substantially. The underlying priorities, however, have been remarkably consistent.

Clayman wants an offense that applies pressure without becoming careless. High Point pressures the rim, the foul line, the offensive glass and, increasingly, the three-point line. At the same time, the Panthers consistently avoid turnovers and limit the number of possessions that end without a legitimate scoring opportunity.

His preferred roster is built around multiple creators rather than one conventional point guard, low-usage shooters who stretch the defense without monopolizing the ball, versatile forwards who can score through contact, and centers who finish, rebound and protect the rim without requiring post touches.

The most significant change came when Clayman became head coach. The 2025–26 team retained the offensive principles from the previous two seasons but accelerated the tempo, increased ball movement, sharply reduced midrange volume and transformed the defense from a relatively passive shot-containment unit into one of the country’s most disruptive turnover-producing groups.

The clearest summary of the Clayman model is:

Create more usable possessions than the opponent, attack before the defense is organized, place multiple threats around the ball, and avoid wasting possessions on turnovers or low-value shots.

I. The three-year statistical fingerprint

The following Hoop-Explorer comparison provides the cleanest view of the evolution:

The broad trend is easy to see.

The first two teams were elite offensively because they combined interior scoring, free throws, offensive rebounding and very good shotmaking. The first Clayman head-coached team preserved those strengths but became more modern in its distribution and far more aggressive in its pace and defensive disruption.

II. Offensive identity: pressure without recklessness

Clayman’s offense is not simply a “shoot a lot of threes” system. It is a possession-pressure system.

The Panthers try to stress defenses in four connected ways:

1. Get to the rim.
2. Earn free throws.
3. Create second chances.
4. Generate threes when the defense collapses.

The fifth component, and arguably the most important, is that High Point does all of this while protecting the basketball.

Ball security is the non-negotiable

High Point’s turnover rate improved in every season:

• 16.2% in 2023–24
• 15.5% in 2024–25
• 13.1% in 2025–26

The 2025–26 figure ranked fifth nationally in the Hoop-Explorer data. KenPom placed High Point at approximately 12.8%, also fifth nationally.

This is the strongest recurring coaching signal in the dataset.

Plenty of teams play fast. Plenty shoot threes. Plenty attack the offensive glass. Doing all three without turning the ball over is much more difficult.

Clayman appears willing to accept some difficult shot-making from his primary creators, but he is much less tolerant of empty possessions caused by careless decisions. That helps explain why certain guards can remain valuable even when their shooting percentages are imperfect.

Rob Martin, for example, finished with a modest 47.7% eFG percentage but carried a 28.4% usage rate, produced a 25.5% assist rate and committed turnovers on only 12.0% of his possessions. His value was not simply measured by whether he made jumpers. He could initiate offense, reach the line, advance the ball at speed and create a shot without frequently giving the possession away.

That is a highly Clayman-compatible profile.

III. What shots Clayman wants

1. The rim remains the first point of pressure

High Point’s rim rates were:

• 42.9% in 2023–24
• 35.7% in 2024–25
• 41.5% in 2025–26

The 2024–25 decline was real, but it was more personnel-dependent than philosophical. That roster was exceptionally efficient on jump shots and included several players capable of punishing defenses away from the basket.

Once Clayman built the 2025–26 roster entirely around his own vision, rim volume returned to 41.5%, while the Panthers converted 62.1% of those attempts.

That is important as High Point did not merely reach the rim frequently. It arrived with advantages and converted.

The roster included several different forms of rim pressure:

• Rob Martin’s downhill creation and foul drawing
• Terry Anderson’s strength, offensive rebounding and interior finishing
• Cam’Ron Fletcher’s athletic slashing
• Owen Aquino’s screening and interior presence
• Secondary cuts from wings and guards
• Transition opportunities created by defensive turnovers

Unlike under Huss with Juslin Bodo Bodo, the offense was not dependent on a traditional post-up center to generate paint production. Rim pressure came from guards, wings, forwards, cuts, rolls, offensive rebounds and early offense.

2. Midrange shots are tolerated only when personnel justifies them

The three-year midrange pattern is revealing:

• 17.7% of attempts in 2023–24
• 24.9% in 2024–25
• 14.9% in 2025–26

The 2024–25 team was an extreme outlier because it made 50.7% of its midrange attempts, ranking second nationally in the Hoop-Explorer comparison. That is not normal midrange efficiency so it made the shot worth taking.

Clayman did not eliminate those attempts merely because they were theoretically less valuable. His personnel were converting them at an elite level, so the offense continued using them.

The next roster was far less effective there, making 42.8%. Midrange volume consequently collapsed to 14.9%, one of the lowest rates in Division I.

That suggests a pragmatic rather than doctrinaire approach: Clayman does not ban the midrange. He demands that it justify itself.

When the roster contained elite midrange shot-makers, High Point leaned into it. When it did not, the offense redirected those attempts toward the rim, three-point line and foul line.

What this most shows is that Flynn’s scheme isn’t so rigid as to force players to adapt to his scheme or take away strengths. His one steadfast rule is do what is most effective given the roster.

3. Three-point volume is increasingly important

High Point’s three-point attempt rate held at 39.4% in each of the first two seasons before climbing to 43.6% in 2025–26.

The more meaningful development was how those threes were distributed.

Clayman appears to prefer assigning high three-point volume to specialists and complementary scorers rather than requiring every high-usage creator to also be the team’s primary shooter.

Examples include:

• Trae Benham: low usage, 37.4% and 40.0% from three in the first two seasons
• Chase Johnston: 41.5% in 2024–25 and 47.7% in 2025–26
• Scotty Washington: 38.7%
• Braden Hausen: 35.3% on 150 attempts

Chase Johnston is perhaps the purest example of the preferred spacing specialist. In 2025–26 he used only 14.1% of possessions, posted a 139.8 offensive rating, turned the ball over on just 6.7% of possessions and made 47.7% of his threes.

That archetype is tremendously valuable in Clayman’s system because it creates room for more physical, downhill players without demanding additional touches.

4. The free-throw line is a structural component, not a bonus

High Point’s free-throw rates were consistently elevated:

• 43.2 in 2023–24, seventh nationally in the Hoop-Explorer table
• 37.2 in 2024–25
• 40.8 in 2025–26

The Panthers also derived a significant share of their points from free throws. KenPom’s 2025–26 profile showed approximately 21.7% of High Point’s points coming at the line.

That reflects more than individual foul drawing. The entire offensive structure is designed to place defenders in recovery:

• early attacks before help is set
• drives against spread floors
• physical finishes by larger wings
• offensive rebounds near the basket
• rolls and cuts behind rotating defenders
• repeated paint touches

Kezza Giffa’s enormous free-throw rates in the first two seasons, followed by Martin’s 46.3 FTR and Anderson’s 64.7 FTR in 2025–26, show that Clayman consistently places high-usage responsibility in the hands of players willing to attack contact.

IV. Pace: not merely fast, but early

The pace data shows the largest year-to-year evolution.

The 2025–26 team was fundamentally different. It was not just playing more possessions because opponents played fast. High Point’s own average offensive possession lasted only 15.9 seconds.

That points to an intentional early-offense philosophy:

• Advance the ball quickly.
• Attack cross-matches.
• Flow into action before the defense is organized.
• Take an available rim attempt or open three without demanding multiple preliminary actions.
• Use pressure defense to create transition and semi-transition chances.

Haslametrics ranked the Panthers’ pace 22nd nationally. KenPom had them 40th. Hoop-Explorer placed them inside the top 60. The precise ranking changes by methodology, but every source agrees that High Point played substantially faster under Clayman as head coach.

The important distinction is that this was not a reckless tempo. The Panthers simultaneously ranked among the national leaders in avoiding turnovers.

High Point played fast in order to attack advantages, not simply to just increase shot volume. A high-volume of efficient shots equals elite offense.

V. Ball movement: more connected without becoming passive

Assist rate rose from:

• 40.7% in 2023–24
• 45.2% in 2024–25
• 52.8% in 2025–26

The first two offenses were highly efficient despite ranking near the bottom of Division I in assist rate. They relied heavily on downhill creation, individual scoring, post seals, offensive rebounds and direct attacks.

Clayman’s first head-coached roster moved toward a more interconnected model. The increase to 52.8% did not come with more turnovers. High Point assisted more frequently while reducing its turnover rate to 13.1%.

That suggests improved decision-making rather than merely more passing.

The roster contained several legitimate facilitators:

• Martin: 25.5% assist rate
• Conrad Martinez: 23.2%
• Aquino: 15.2%
• Vincent Brady II: 13.2%
• Terry Anderson: 11.9%

The ability of the center and forward positions to pass is relevant. Clayman’s ideal offense does not appear to want four players standing still while one point guard creates everything. It benefits from players who can continue an advantage with a quick pass, handoff, short-roll decision or drive-and-kick read.

VI. Offensive rebounding: an important tool, but no longer the sole possession advantage

The 2023–24 team was an elite offensive rebounding group:

• 36.7% offensive rebounding rate
• 10th nationally in Hoop-Explorer
• 36.9% in KenPom, also among the national leaders

That rate fell to 33.4% in 2024–25 and 31.6% in 2025–26.

This does not indicate that Clayman stopped valuing the glass. Terry Anderson, Owen Aquino, Cam’Ron Fletcher and the reserve centers were all capable offensive rebounders. Instead, the method of winning the possession battle changed.

In 2023–24, High Point often created extra value by retrieving misses.

In 2025–26, High Point increasingly created extra value by:

• committing almost no turnovers
• forcing a high volume of opponent turnovers
• creating live-ball transition opportunities
• getting to the foul line
• still remaining solid on the offensive glass

The Panthers no longer needed an elite offensive rebounding rate to dominate the possession economy.

VII. The preferred Clayman player archetypes

The rosters are different enough that rigid positional labels are not especially useful. Functional roles reveal much more.

1. The downhill primary creator

Representative players:

• Kezza Giffa
• Duke Miles
• Rob Martin

This player carries a large usage load, gets two feet into the paint, creates free throws and can manufacture offense late in the clock.

The preferred version is not necessarily a pristine jump shooter. Clayman appears more concerned with:

• advantage creation
• ball security
• foul pressure
• passing competence
• willingness to play fast
• ability to handle defensive attention

Giffa’s extreme free-throw rates and Martin’s high usage with a low turnover rate illustrate the model.

2. The low-usage movement spacer

Representative players:

• Trae Benham
• Chase Johnston
• Braden Hausen
• Scotty Washington

These players punish help without disrupting the offense’s touch hierarchy.

The key statistical characteristics are:

• high three-point volume relative to usage
• strong catch-and-shoot efficiency
• low turnover rates
• ability to occupy multiple perimeter locations
• enough movement intelligence to relocate or cut behind help

The best versions of this role post extraordinarily high offensive ratings because they turn limited touches into efficient shots.

3. The physical multi-level forward

Representative players:

• Kimani Hamilton
• Terry Anderson
• Cam’Ron Fletcher

This may be Clayman’s most important archetype.

These players allow High Point to play with size without sacrificing mobility. They can:

• finish through contact
• attack mismatches
• rebound on both ends
• switch or contain multiple positions
• score without needing a traditional post-up offense
• contribute as cutters, rollers or short-range creators

Anderson’s 2025–26 profile is the strongest example:

• 25.4% usage
• 125.0 offensive rating
• 62.9% true shooting
• 10.1% offensive rebounding rate
• 16.0% defensive rebounding rate
• 11.9% assist rate
• 12.4% turnover rate
• 64.7 free-throw rate
• 63.0% on twos

He combined creation, efficiency, physicality and ball security. EvanMiya’s BPR dashboard ranked him first on the team at 5.24.

That is nearly a perfect Clayman forward.

4. The Low-Maintenance Interior Finisher

Representative Players:

• Juslin Bodo Bodo
• Josh Ibukunoluwa
• Caden Miller

Clayman’s system has repeatedly shown that not every center needs to command touches. In fact, many of his most effective frontcourt pieces have thrived by doing everything except demanding the basketball.

Their responsibilities are simple but invaluable:

• Set physical screens
• Roll hard to the rim
• Finish efficiently
• Dominate the offensive glass
• Protect the rim
• Occupy the dunker spot
• Punish smaller defenders after switches

The offensive value comes from maximizing possessions rather than creating them.

Juslin Bodo Bodo became the prototype during High Point’s 2024-25 NCAA Tournament season. Despite using just 13.8% of offensive possessions, he produced an elite 130.1 Offensive Rating, converted 65.5% of his two-point attempts, grabbed 18.0% of available offensive rebounds, and posted a 6.8% block rate. Every possession was high value despite minimal usage.

Josh Ibukunoluwa followed a similar blueprint as an energy big capable of changing games through rebounding, rim protection and finishing around the basket without disrupting offensive flow.

Returning sophomore, Caden Miller is cut from the same cloth. His long-term projection is as a vertical spacer and defensive anchor whose efficiency comes through screening, rim running and finishing rather than post volume.

The defining characteristic of this archetype is elite efficiency without offensive touch dependence. These players amplify everyone else around them by creating second-chance opportunities, opening driving lanes with screens and converting nearly every clean look generated for them.

5. The Offensive Hub Big

Representative Players:

• Owen Aquino

Not every Clayman center fits the traditional rim-running mold.

The recent evolution of the roster suggests High Point is increasingly valuing another type of frontcourt player: an undersized but highly skilled offensive hub capable of keeping the ball moving while still anchoring the interior.

Rather than simply finishing possessions, these centers help initiate them.

Their responsibilities expand considerably:

• Facilitate offense from the elbows and short roll
• Punish double teams with passing
• Stretch defenses beyond the paint
• Score efficiently on the block when mismatched
• Function as a connective passer
• Protect the rim defensively
• Finish inside without needing isolation touches

Owen Aquino became the first true example of this evolution. While still providing elite interior defense (7.2% block rate), he also recorded a remarkable 15.2% assist rate for a center and demonstrated legitimate floor spacing by making 15-of-34 three-pointers. Rather than serving strictly as a finisher, Aquino frequently became an offensive decision-maker who kept possessions alive with quick reads and timely passes.

6. The secondary organizer and point-of-attack pest

Representative players:

• Bobby Pettiford
• Conrad Martinez
• Scotty Washington
• Vincent Brady

These players allow the offense to remain functional when the primary creator gives up the ball. They also serve an important role in Clayman’s defensive model.

Martinez’s profile is particularly revealing:

• 23.2% assist rate
• 14.8% turnover rate
• 3.5% steal rate
• 83.7% free-throw shooting
• 119.5 offensive rating

He was not a high-volume scorer, but he connected possessions and created defensive disruption.

VIII. Lineup construction

Clayman consistently builds lineups around complementary functions rather than traditional positions.

The most successful combinations commonly contain:

• one primary creator
• at least two credible perimeter spacers
• one versatile forward
• one big
• multiple players capable of making a secondary decision

The 2025–26 EvanMiya combinations reinforce this.

Best high-volume two-man combination

Terry Anderson and Braden Hausen

• 122.1 raw offensive efficiency
• 96.5 raw defensive efficiency
• +16.0 observed efficiency margin
• 854 possessions

Best high-volume three-man combination

Anderson, Hausen and Scotty Washington

• 122.3 offensive efficiency
• 89.3 defensive efficiency
• +25.6 margin
• 504 possessions

Best high-volume four-man combination

Anderson, Hausen, Rob Martin and Washington

• 119.7 offensive efficiency
• 90.3 defensive efficiency
• +25.4 margin
• 391 possessions

These combinations make functional sense.

Anderson supplies physicality and interior pressure. Hausen and Washington provide spacing. Martin creates advantages. The lineup has enough size to defend while maintaining multiple perimeter threats.

Clayman also used a broad rotation. KenPom showed 35.7% of the team’s minutes coming from the bench in 2025–26, 80th nationally. The five most frequently used lineups over the closing stretch accounted for only about half of the available minutes.

That indicates both flexibility and a willingness to deploy specialized units rather than forcing one static starting group to solve every matchup.

IX. The defensive transformation

This is where Clayman made his largest imprint as a head coach.

The defensive efficiency progression was:

• 110.6 in 2023–24, 259th
• 107.7 in 2024–25, 185th
• 106.3 in 2025–26, 113th

Other systems produced slightly different ratings, but all showed meaningful improvement. KenPom ranked the 2025–26 defense approximately 141st, while Haslametrics placed it 95th. EvanMiya’s team-level and player-level data also show a clear rise in defensive value.

The improvement was not primarily caused by becoming an elite defensive shooting team. Opponents still posted a 50.5% eFG percentage, roughly average nationally.

The improvement came from destroying possessions before a shot occurred.

The turnover leap

Opponent turnover rate rose from:

• 14.1% in 2023–24
• 16.5% in 2024–25
• 21.5% in 2025–26

KenPom had High Point at 21.3%, sixth nationally, with a 14.1% steal rate that ranked second.

This was not a small adjustment. It was a different defensive identity.

The Panthers moved from one of the country’s least disruptive defenses to one of its most disruptive in two seasons.

EvanMiya’s Bayesian Performance Rating (BPR) an all-in-one metric that estimates a team’s overall quality based on offensive and defensive impact—shows the same trend:

High Point’s total BPR improved from 4.24 to 9.25 to 10.59. As HPU’s offense was already excellent in the first two seasons, the final step was driven far more by defense than offense.

X. The Methodology of the Defense

1. Aggressive ball pressure began well before the shot

High Point forced turnovers on more than one-fifth of opponent possessions, with an elite steal rate. That level of disruption requires much more than passive half-court containment.

The roster was built for it:

• Martinez: 3.5% steal rate
• Martin: 2.9%
• Anderson: 2.9%
• Johnston: 2.8%
• Washington: 2.4%
• Fletcher: 3.0%
• Brady: 3.2%

The pressure was distributed across the rotation rather than being dependent on one gambling guard.

2. The defense lengthened opponent possessions

High Point played fast offensively, but opponents averaged approximately 18.0 seconds per possession, ranking 282nd in defensive possession length.

That combination is significant.

The Panthers were not simply gambling for steals and surrendering immediate shots whenever the gamble failed. They often made opponents take longer to initiate offense, reset actions or work later into the shot clock.

Keys to the defense:

• pressure the initial advance
• disrupt entry angles
• deny comfortable initiation
• force the ball away from the preferred handler
• recover behind the pressure
• make the opponent execute late in the possession

That is a more sophisticated form of aggression than merely playing frantically.

3. High Point traded some three-point volume for disruption

Opponent shot distribution changed dramatically:

The 2025–26 defense pushed opponents away from midrange shots and toward threes.

That is consistent with aggressive help, rotation and ball pressure. When the first action is disrupted, offenses often respond by moving the ball around the perimeter and settling for a later three.

High Point allowed a high proportion of opponent threes, but opponents converted only 32.6%, a strong result. KenPom also had the Panthers’ three-point defense at 32.6%, 98th nationally.

Some of that percentage is shooting variance, so it should not be assumed that every allowed three was heavily contested. The strategic trade was still favorable because the pressure also generated so many turnovers.

4. Rim protection was collective, not purely center-dependent

The Panthers blocked approximately 10.6% to 10.7% of opponent two-point attempts, above average but not elite.

Aquino’s 7.2% block rate was the main interior deterrent. Caden Miller posted 9.0% in limited minutes. Fletcher, Anderson and the wings added supplementary length.

The defense did not completely eliminate rim attempts. Opponents still took 39.2% of shots there and made 56.6%. The system’s primary defensive weapon was therefore not traditional paint lockdown as it was with Bodo.

It was disruption before the attempt.

5. Defensive rebounding remained adequate rather than dominant

Opponents collected approximately 30.8% to 31.1% of available offensive rebounds, slightly worse than the national average.

This is a logical cost of an aggressive system. When perimeter defenders pressure, stunt, rotate or pursue steals, block-out assignments can become more difficult.

Clayman had to be willing to accept a merely average defensive rebounding profile in exchange for:

• more turnovers
• more live-ball steals
• more transition offense
• more disrupted halfcourt possessions

*Read Part II for how this looks to be addressed*

XI. Defensive evolution across the three seasons

2023–24: protect areas, concede creation

The 2023–24 defense forced very few turnovers and allowed opponents to execute relatively comfortably. Its shot profile did have some sensible features:

• low opponent three-point rate
• substantial midrange volume
• manageable rim efficiency

This was a more conservative containment approach designed to influence shot location. The issue was that it rarely removed possessions from the opponent.

2024–25: better interior structure and shot defense

The 2024–25 team improved substantially:

• opponent eFG% fell to 49.1%
• opponent two-point percentage fell to 48.9%
• opponent rim rate fell to 36.2%
• rim percentage allowed fell to 54.5%

Bodo Bodo’s rim protection and rebounding played a major role. This was the best pure shot-defense season of the three.

Turnover creation improved modestly but remained secondary.

2025–26: pressure becomes the system

Clayman’s first team as head coach shifted the priority from merely influencing the eventual shot to interfering with the entire possession.

The result:

• seventh nationally in opponent turnover rate by Hoop-Explorer
• sixth by KenPom
• second in steal rate
• 32 opponent offensive “runs” or “kill shots” created compared with only eight conceded
• defensive BPR improvement from -0.25 to +2.72

The defense became an offensive weapon.

XII. What Clayman values most in recruiting

Based on the player profiles, lineup usage and year-to-year system changes, the following characteristics appear especially important.

Decision speed

Players must be able to recognize an advantage quickly. The 15.9-second offensive possession length leaves little room for slow processing.

Functional versatility

Clayman does not need every player to do everything, but he needs lineups to contain multiple skills at once. A forward who rebounds and passes, a center who can facilitate, or a shooter who can pressure the ball is more valuable than a single-purpose player who compromises lineup structure.

Ball security

Low turnover rates appear to be one of the quickest routes to playing time. Johnston, Hausen, Washington, Martin and Anderson all protected possessions well relative to their roles.

Rim pressure or spacing gravity

Most major rotation players provide at least one of these two qualities. The best lineups combine both.

Physicality without excessive fouling

High Point wants to attack the foul line while avoiding surrendering the same advantage. In 2025–26, the Panthers posted a 40.8 offensive FTR against a 35.5 defensive FTR.

Defensive activity

Steal generation became a roster-wide responsibility. Clayman appears to prefer guards and wings who can pressure the ball, jump passing lanes and recover rather than defenders who merely remain in position.

Experience and role clarity

The 2025–26 team had 2.25 years of Division I experience on average, 35th nationally in the KenPom profile. Most high-leverage roles were occupied by experienced transfers or upperclassmen.

Veteran players are a necessity when asking players to operate quickly and efficiently on offense and aggressively on defense.

XIII. What is structural and what is personnel-dependent

Structural Clayman traits

These have appeared consistently enough to be treated as system principles:

• Efficient offense
• Low turnover rates
• Strong free-throw generation
• Significant rim pressure
• Productive offensive rebounding
• Specialized perimeter shooting
• High-usage downhill creators
• Low-usage efficient finishers
• Versatile, physical forwards
• Willingness to use a deep rotation
• Role-based rather than position-based lineup construction

Personnel-dependent traits

These changed substantially and should not be treated as permanent rules:

• Exact pace
• Midrange volume
• Three-point percentage
• Offensive rebounding intensity
• Frequency of assisted baskets
• Amount of center shooting
• Low-usage centers
• Extent of perimeter defensive aggression

The key is that Clayman has shown adaptability inside a stable framework.

He did not force the 2024–25 team to abandon an extremely efficient midrange game. He did not require the 2025–26 roster to recreate that profile. He instead reallocated shots toward the areas where the new team was strongest.

XIV. The most important analytical conclusions

1. Clayman’s offense is fundamentally about possession quality

Shot selection matters, but the Panthers’ greatest advantage comes from combining useful shots with very few turnovers.

2. He prefers pressure creators over pure shot creators

The most important offensive players get downhill, draw fouls, force help and create rotation. They do not need to be elite pull-up shooters to have value.

3. Shooting is often supplied by complementary specialists

Clayman’s best spacing pieces tend to have modest usage, low turnover rates and high three-point volume.

4. The power forward is often the tactical center of the roster

Hamilton and Anderson supplied scoring, rebounding, physicality and lineup versatility. Their ability to play inside or outside allowed Clayman to vary formations without making wholesale substitutions.

5. The center’s job is to amplify others

Screens, rolls, rebounds, rim protection and efficient finishing matter more than post-up volume.

6. Pace is a weapon, but only when paired with control

The 2025–26 Panthers played at one of the country’s fastest tempos while ranking among the five best teams in turnover avoidance.

7. The defense under Clayman is designed to generate offense

The leap in steal rate and opponent turnover rate was too large to be accidental. Clayman built a roster and scheme that attempted to manufacture transition chances through disruption.

8. He is willing to concede certain shots to win the possession battle

The 2025–26 team allowed more threes and was only average in defensive eFG%, but it improved substantially because so many possessions ended before a shot.

Final assessment

Flynn Clayman’s ideal team is not defined by one formation or one play type. It is defined by the interaction of pace, spacing, physicality and decision-making.

Offensively, High Point wants to play before the defense is comfortable, create a rim or free-throw advantage, and punish collapsing help with three-point shooting. The Panthers attack the offensive glass enough to create additional pressure, but their primary possession advantage comes from exceptional ball security.

Defensively, Clayman’s first season revealed a far more aggressive vision than the previous two years. High Point pressured the ball, disrupted initiation, generated steals and forced opponents into longer, less comfortable possessions. It accepted more opponent three-point attempts and some defensive rebounding vulnerability in exchange for one of the nation’s highest turnover rates.

The preferred roster reflects that philosophy. Clayman values downhill guards, efficient low-usage shooters, physical multi-positional forwards, low-maintenance centers and secondary handlers who can defend. His best players are not necessarily those with the broadest individual scoring packages. They are the players whose skills combine cleanly with four others.

The ultimate Clayman formula is:

Play quickly, think quickly, protect the basketball, pressure the paint, surround creation with shooting, use size without sacrificing mobility, and make the opponent uncomfortable before it can begin its offense.